







Carlos Pestana Barros & Nicolas Peypoch  
 
 
A Comparative Analysis of Productivity Change in Italian and 




















Department of Economics 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
ISSN Nº 0874-4548 
School of Economics and Management 












Maria Rosa Borges 
Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao 
Technical University of Lisbon 
























Since the 1960’s, there is an ongoing debate on dividend policy, which remains a controversial issue to 
this day. Why do firms pay dividends? The academics have not been able to agree on any convincing 
explanation, and the same time, many even claim that firms should not pay dividends, and so we have a 
“dividend puzzle”. The purpose of this paper is to summarize the main findings of two more recent fields 
of research, and to discuss why they seem to be the most promising avenues for further research, to solve 
the “dividend puzzle”, and to build a complete payout policy theory. These fields are: (i) the agency 
theory and (ii) the lifecycle theory. Besides being very intuitive, these theories are consistent with most 
empirical facts on U.S. firms’ payout policy. 
 




Since the pioneering works of Gordon (1959), Lintner (1956, 1962), and Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) there is an ongoing debate on dividend policy, which has been a 
controversial issue to this day. Black (1976) finds no convincing explanation of why 
firms pay cash dividends and talks about a “dividend puzzle”. Authors have produced 
extensive and sometimes conflicting research, with several alternative theories trying to 
explain why firms pay dividends, or why they should not pay dividends, or even why 
this decision may be irrelevant. Through the years, the empirical evidence did not 
clearly favour any of the proposed alternatives. In the United States, the “dividend 
puzzle” is even deeper, as historically dividends have been generally taxed higher than 
capital gains, and this makes it even more difficult to understand why dividends are 
favoured. Taxes and investor clienteles (Elton and Gruber, 1970), have spawned a very 
extensive body of work, but mostly favouring the view that firms should not pay 
dividends, which is not helpful to explain why firms pay dividends. 
 
Perhaps the most influential work in this field is the seminal paper of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), who show that, in perfect markets, the payout decision is irrelevant 
because it neither creates nor destroys value for shareholders. If the investment decision 
is held constant, higher dividends result in lower capital gains, leaving the total wealth 
of shareholders unchanged. However, contrary to this theory, firms have been for the 
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past decades following very clear rules in setting their dividend policy (Lintner, 1956; 
Brav et al., 2005), which would be incomprehensible, if they believed this decision to 
be irrelevant. 
 
In the real world, with market imperfections such as taxes and transaction costs, and 
other issues such as information asymmetries and agency problems, dividend policy 
seems to be very relevant, both for the managers of the firms, shareholders, prospective 
investors and market analysts. Not only do managers show extra care in their payout 
decisions, especially in changing payout decisions, but also the markets react strongly to 
dividend changes, and more so, to dividend omissions and initiations, as proved by 
Aharony and Swary (1980) and Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995). 
. 
Information asymmetry and signalling (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; 
Miller and Rock, 1985) have been proposed as explanations for positive dividends, with 
some supporting evidence. However, the signalling hypothesis has been loosing ground, 
as more recent research (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 1996; Benartzi, Michaely 
and Thaler, 1997) shows that dividend changes are not very good predictors of future 
earnings changes. If the signal does not work, why send it? Furthermore, in an extensive 
enquiry, Brav et al. (2005) find that financial managers do not have a signalling purpose, 
when they decide on payout policy. How can dividends be a signal, if managers do not 
mean them to be one? 
 
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the main findings of two more recent fields 
of research, and to discuss why they seem to be the most promising avenues for further 
research, to solve the “dividend puzzle”, and to build a complete payout policy theory. 
These fields are: (i) the agency theory and (ii) the lifecycle theory. 
 
Agency theory, as applied at the firm level, relates to all the conflicts of interest that 
may arise within the company, between the decision makers (managers) and all claim 
holders on the firm, including shareholders, debt holders and employees. The conflicts 
of interest that are more interesting, for the purpose of this paper, are those that occur 
between shareholders and managers, resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control. In most big firms, the capital is owned by a large and diffuse group of investors 
who delegate management decisions to professionals, who often are not shareholders of 
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the firm. Managers are appointed to act as agents of the shareholders, but in practice it is 
generally difficult for shareholders to control the actions of managers, as they will have 
less information. Ineffective control allows managers to pursue their own interests, 
taking decisions that may not be on the best interest of shareholders.  
 
If we define free cash-flow as excess cash, not needed for positive NPV investments, it 
is easy to understand that agency costs arising between managers and shareholders are 
higher, when free cash-flow is higher. Managers may be tempted to pursuit non-
profitable investments, including mergers and acquisitions, if they expect to gain 
prestige from the growth of the firm, or on excessive salaries, luxury consumption, asset 
diverting and outright theft. The interesting point is that dividend policy may help 
reduce agency costs. How does this work? 
 
The first mechanism is proposed by Easterbrook (1984), who argues that increasing 
dividends, all else being constant, forces the firm to increase the frequency of external 
capital raising and associated monitoring by investment bankers and investors, which 
reduces the degree of freedom of managers, for non-profitable investment decisions. 
The importance of monitoring is recognized by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch (2000) who note that institutional investors prefer to own shares of 
firms making regular payments, and this type of investor is more prone to frequent 
monitoring than small shareholders. The second mechanism is more direct. Jensen 
(1986) points out that if agency problems are linked to free cash-flow, because money is 
the asset that managers can misuse most easily, these problems can be reduced if free 
cash-flow is minimized, and shareholders can achieve this by forcing managers to pay 
higher dividends.  
 
So, perhaps one of the principal remedies to agency costs is the legal environment (La 
Porta et al., 2000), as some work (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003) shows that agency 
costs are likely to be inversely related to the strength of shareholders rights. In common-
law countries such as the U.S.A. and U.K., where the protection of minority 
shareholders is higher, the outright expropriation of corporate assets by managers is 
relatively rare, and so the main agency problems are related to non-value-maximixing 
investment decisions. In civil-law countries, such as most western European countries, 
the protection of minority shareholders is lower, and so agency costs should be higher.  
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La Porta et al. (2000) use the level of legal shareholder protection as a proxy to agency 
problems to test two alternative models. First, the outcome model suggests that 
dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure the managers to disgorge 
excess cash, to avoid its misuse, by exercising their legal rights to protest and resisting 
against management decisions. Second, the substitution model predicts that firms with 
weaker shareholder rights need to establish a reputation for non expropriating the wealth 
of shareholders, in order to be able to reduce the cost of raising external capital. A 
reputation for good treatment of shareholders is more important for firms in low legal 
protection countries, as shareholders may have nothing else to rely on. So, if the 
outcome model is correct, we should find that payout ratios are generally higher in high 
protection countries than in low protection countries, and the inverse result would 
suggest that the substitution model is correct. The authors find that payout ratios are 
generally higher in high protection countries, supporting the outcome model of 
dividends. These results are confirmed by Bartram et al. (2007) in a more generalised 
context, considering more countries, more firm-years and including share repurchases 
along with cash dividends in the payout ratio. 
 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) note that: “Dividends tend to be paid by mature 
established firms, plausibly reflecting a financial lifecycle in which young firms face 
relatively abundant investment opportunities with limited resources so that retention 
dominates distribution, whereas mature firms are better candidates to pay dividends 
because they have higher profitability and fewer attractive investment opportunities.” 
Also in other works such as Fama and French (2001), Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), lifecycle explanations for 
dividends rely on the trade-off between the advantages and disadvantages of paying 
dividends, which evolve over time as the firm matures, profits cumulate and investment 
opportunities decline. Young firms prefer to retain all internal resources and do not pay 
dividends, and they also need external (contributed) resources. Larger firms with 
moderate growth rates payout a small part of their profits and retain the rest, to finance 
continuing investment and growth. As firms reach a stage where their growth is slow, 
and investment opportunities are scarce, free cash-flow tends to grow and so payout 
ratios also increase, both through dividends and share repurchases, thus avoiding the 
agency problems of retaining excess cash. 
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Confirming this theory, Fama and French (2001) find that firms with current high 
profitability and low growth perspectives tend to pay dividends, while low profit/high 
growth firms tend to retain any profits. Also, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) 
show that the fraction of firms that pay dividends is high when retained earnings are a 
large portion of total equity (mature firms) and falls to near zero when most equity is 
contributed rather than earned (young firms). 
 
Note that the lifecycle theory of dividends is reconcilable with the outcome model of La 
Porta el al. (2000). In fact, another important prediction of the outcome model is that 
firms with higher investment opportunities have lower payouts, even if only in countries 
where minority shareholders enjoy better protection. This happens because investors 
understand these growth opportunities and so they should exert less pressure on the firm. 
Again, this prediction is confirmed by the empirical results of La Porta et al. (2000) and 
other replicating studies, including Bartram et al. (2007). 
 
The agency/free cash-flow/outcome model, together with the lifecycle theory, seem to 
be the best lines of research for a complete positive theory of dividends. Besides being 
very intuitive, these theories are consistent with most empirical facts on U.S. firms’ 
payout policy, documented in extensive research (Linter, 1956; Fama and Babiak, 1968; 
Fama and French, 2001; De Angelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2004; Grullon et al., 2005; 
Brav et al., 2005), including: (i) total payout is massive, and has consistently grown 
through the years; (ii) dividends are concentrated in a small number of firms, with very 
high profits; (iii) dividends and profits are positively correlated, through time and cross-
sectionally; (iv) dividends are mostly paid by mature firms, and not by young firms; (v) 
firms pay dividends through time and do not cumulate excessive cash; (vi) dividend 
changes are assymetric, with the number of increases exceeding decreases; (vii) 
dividend changes are due to firm-specific events, as increases are linked to higher 
profits and decreases reflect losses and financial distress; (viii) stock prices go up 
following unexpected dividend increases and fall after unexpected dividend decreases; 
(ix) unexpected changes in dividends do not predict future surprises in profits; and 




One final point to note is that these two theories are also consistent with the pre-Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) view that dividends are good, namely, the bird-in-the-hand 
theory of Lintner (1962) and Gordon (1959). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) point out 
to the irrelevance of the irrelevance proposition of Miller and Modigliani, arguing that 
their conclusion is constrained by the assumption that free cash-flows are 100% 
distributed each year, and also claim that the “dividend puzzle” of Black (1976) is 
solved by the lifecycle theory. In the real world, with agency problems between 
managers and shareholders, the latter may definitely believe that one dollar of dividends 
(in the hand) is worth more than one dollar of retained earnings (in the bush), due to the 
risk of suboptimal investment decisions by managers if excess cash is available. In this 
context, shareholders use their rights to force firms to pay dividends, especially if they 
believe that growth opportunities are low. In the next few years, it will be very 
interesting to see if this theories resist to new empirical evidence. If they do, then maybe 
we have found the new paradigm that will replace the irrelevance proposition of Miller 
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